The governance of high performance sport by Ferkins, Dr Lesley & Bottenburg, Maarten Van
1 
 
Book Title: Managing High Performance Sport 
 
Chapter 3: The Governance of High Performance Sport 
Lesley Ferkins, Deakin University and Maarten Van Bottenburg, Utrecht University 
 
Learning outcomes (Main Heading – Level A) 
Upon completion of this chapter the reader should be able to: 
 Discuss meanings and definitions associated with the governance of sport in the high 
performance setting 
 Distinguish between organizational governance and systemic governance in relation 
to the evolving nature of high performance governance practice 
 Discuss issues and trends associated with the governance of high performance sport 
on the international stage  
 
Overview of chapter (Main Heading – Level A) 
We begin by providing some context to the notion of governance, and how we have come to 
use the concept in connection with the management of high performance sport. We then set 
out more specific meanings and definitions associated with the concept of governance, 
followed by a discussion of some of the theories that can help make sense of governance 
issues in high performance sport. We then examine two modes of governance: governance of 
organizations (referring to corporate or organizational governance) and governance between 
organizations (referring to systemic, network or configurational governance). We conclude 
the chapter with an analysis of the issues and trends associated with the governance of high 
performance sport on the international stage. The case study and examples embedded within 
the chapter serve to exemplify the concepts, issues and practices introduced and discussed.   
 
 
Introduction (Main Heading - Level A) 
 
Almost thirty years ago, when the Cold War between the East and the West was still being 
waged, the Finnish sociologist Kalevi Heinilä noticed that high performance sport had 
evolved from being a contest between individuals and teams into a battle between systems. 
Talented athletes still competed against each other, he argued, but their success increasingly 
depended on the performance capacity of the system they represented, including all the 
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organizing resources, the means of regulation, and the interest groups which maintained and 
promoted high performance sport at that time (Heinilä, 1982). 
 
The Cold War is over, but the ‘Gold War’ continues. The struggle to win major sport 
competitions has intensified. Elite athletes still need talent, spirit and dedication, but they 
increasingly rely on a network of sport organizations, governments, sponsors and other 
stakeholders to reach the top (De Bosscher & Van Bottenburg, 2011). This has been 
accompanied by rapidly escalating investments and the involvement of a growing number of 
people and organizations. As a result, there is now a greater need for co-ordination and 
control in high performance sport (Oakley & Green, 2001; De Bosscher et al., 2008). This 
intensification of competition has also raised the expectations placed on board members of 
sport organizations to deliver improved elite sport performances and to meet demands for 
efficiency, effectiveness, stakeholder representation, transparency, and accountability (Hoye 
& Cuskelly, 2007). These issues are directly linked to the central theme to be discussed in 
this chapter: the governance of high performance sport. We now turn our attention to the 
meanings and definitions associated with this concept of governance.  
 
Defining governance and sport governance (Main Heading – Level A) 
 
Etymologically, the term governance derives from the Greek kubernân and kybernetes which 
mean to ‘steer’ and ‘pilot or helmsman’, respectively, (Rosenau, 1995). The derivatives of 
this term were used mainly in the sense of ‘the act or manner in governing’; and as a 
synonym for government (Kjaer, 2004). However, since the 1980s scientists from diverse 
disciplines (political sciences, public administration, organizational studies, business studies, 
and international relations) have come to refer to governance as something broader than 
government (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). They have increasingly come to use the term to 
mean a process in which an organization, network of organizations, or a society steers itself, 
allocates resources, and exercises control and co-ordination (Rosenau, 1995; Rhodes, 1996). 
 
Today, the concept of governance is widely used in public, non-profit, and the private sectors. 
It “generally refers to the means for achieving direction, control, and coordination of wholly 
or partially autonomous individuals or organizations on behalf of interests to which they 
jointly contribute” (Lynn et al., 2000, p. 235). All sport organizations, from local clubs to 
national bodies, government agencies, sport service organizations and professional teams 
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around the world, need to be directed, controlled and regulated (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). 
However, none of these sport organizations can act independently of other sporting agencies. 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) determines, for example, whether cricket will 
be included in the Olympic programme, with far-reaching consequences for national and 
local cricket organizations, individual cricket players, and other stakeholders. Yet, the 
international governing body in cricket (i.e., the International Cricket Council, ICC) is the 
leading organization in the regulation of its competition rules, whether this concerns the 
Olympic Games or any other international tournament.  
 
When a major crisis erupts in international cricket, such as allegations of match fixing, it is 
the ICC that takes action in sanctioning such behaviour. But if such a crisis were confined to 
Australia, the national sport federation (e.g. Cricket Australia) would be expected to 
intervene. Cricket Australia also has leadership responsibilities for the sport in Australia and, 
as such, plays a governing role across organizational boundaries exercising co-ordination 
with and control over state and club level cricket. However, when it comes to raising the 
overall level of Australia’s high performance sport, including cricket, this responsibility is 
scattered among numerous agencies; from government agencies (e.g. the Australian Sports 
Commission and the Australian Institute of Sport) to voluntary sport associations (at a 
national, state, and local level), the corporate sector (e.g. sponsors), and many other 
stakeholders (e.g. sport science institutes, physical educationalists and coaches associations). 
In such a configuration, it could be argued that there is no one agency that is hierarchically 
subordinated to another. Thus, central steering is replaced by another mode of governance, 
based on joint action, mutual adjustment, and networking (Kooiman, 1993). 
 
To get to grips with issues of steering, accountability and responsibility in high performance 
sport, we will concentrate in this chapter on the distinction between governance of 
organizations and governance between organizations. Governance of organizations refers to 
corporate and/or organizational governance. These terms encompass the governance issues, 
practices and processes of a specific organization, such as a local sport club or national sport 
organization. Corporate governance points to large commercial organizations. Organizational 
governance is broader and can also concern non-profit organizations, which are very 
prominent within the sport sector. Governance between organizations is related to the 
governance of high performance sport in a system, network or configuration of institutions. It 
encompasses, for example, governance issues within a nation and across sports (e.g. the 
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governance of high performance sport in the UK), or within a sport or group of sports across 
nations (e.g. the governance of football by FIFA or of the Olympic movement by the IOC). 
Depending on their inter-organizational relationships and the theoretical framework used to 
analyse them, these latter modes of governance can be characterized as systemic, network or 
configurational governance1, or, at the highest level, global governance. 
  
Before exploring organizational and systemic governance in more depth, we will first 
introduce you to some theories that can help us understand the implications and 
complications of these modes of governance in high performance sport. 
 
Helpful theories in the governance of high performance sport (Main Heading - Level A) 
 
The application of theory can help make sense of these tensions and dilemmas, and at least in 
part, explain why things occur in the way they do. If we are lucky, a good theory can also 
help guide good practice. While there is no agreed universal theory of governance (Huse, 
2009), researchers are starting to gather together a suite of theories, borrowed from other 
elements of organizational studies, public management and international relations. Some of 
these major theories include agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory, network theory, and international relations theory.  
 
While this may mean there are a large number of theories to come to grips with, leading 
authors in governance such as Pye and Pettigrew (2005), Cornforth (2003), and Hoye and 
Cuskelly (2007) encourage us to use a multi-theoretical approach. This is because agency 
theory has, until now, dominated our thinking about the governing role and arguably this has 
created some limitations in our understanding of governance, particularly in the non-profit 
setting (Cornforth, 2003). The use of multiple theories can help us understand individual 
theories by highlighting contrasting approaches, while each theory also offers something 
different in our endeavours to make sense of the various modes, tensions and dilemmas of 
governance in high performance sport. Table 1 below summarizes these theories and also 
relates them to the role and function of the board (in a generic sense) in organisations.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Here, we use these terms interchangeably. 
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Theory used in governance  Premise for governance Implications for board role and 
function  
Agency theory   Owners have different interests 
from those who manage (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983)
To control and monitor the 
actions of the CEO  
Stewardship theory   Owners have similar interests to 
those who manage (Davis & 
Schoorman, 1997)
To partner with CEO  in the 
interests of the organization 
Institutional theory  Design of the governance model  
is the result of external 
pressures to conform (Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007)
To conform to external 
expectations  
Resource dependence theory  Organizations are dependent on 
others for survival (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) 
To build relationships with other 
organizations 
 
Stakeholder theory  A diverse range of interests 
exists among stakeholders 
(Hung, 1998; Oliver, 1990) 
To incorporate stakeholder 
perspectives into the governing 
role and to balance stakeholder 
needs
Network theory  There is interdependence 
between organizations (Henry & 
Lee, 2004; Kooiman, 1993) 
To facilitate networks between 
organizations and individuals 
 
International relations theory  The governance structure is 
fragmented and has multiple 
centres (Kjaer, 2004; Rosenau, 
1995)
To link and change between 
several networks with different 
governance structures 
 
Table 1: Helpful theories in the governance of sport (Source: Adapted from Cornforth, 2003; 
Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007)  
 
Two modes of governance: organizational and systemic governance (Main Heading – 
Level A) 
 
With reference to these theories we now explore in more depth the two modes of governance 
outlined earlier (organizational and systemic). We start with organizational governance which 
focuses on the role of the board as it relates to high performance sport (governance of 
organizations), and then discuss systemic, network and/or configurational governance 
practices across high performance sport systems (governance between organizations). 
 
Organizational governance in high performance sport (Sub Heading – Level B) 
 
6 
 
The governing responsibilities of a sport organization vary considerably between the different 
contexts of commercial elite sport, and non-profit elite sport. In the commercial setting, a 
dominating reason for existence is, by definition, commercial gain for those who have 
invested financially in the sport. Examples of commercial entities in sport are all around us 
and include teams in the English Premier League (e.g. Manchester United Football Club), 
teams in the Australian National Rugby League, (e.g. the Melbourne Storm), and teams in the 
US National Basketball Association (e.g. the Boston Celtics). In these instances the sport 
team or club is owned (in a governance sense) by shareholders who, while often indulging a 
passion, also seek a financial return on their investment. Therefore, the board’s role is to set 
the direction, account for and control activities, and regulate behaviour on behalf of the 
owners, (i.e. shareholders).        
 
Much of our understanding of organizational governance in high performance sport is 
grounded in what we know about governance in the corporate setting outside of the sport 
context. The notion of organizational governance has come about because of the separation of 
ownership between those who traditionally owned the corporation and those who manage it 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). As a result of growth, a company becomes too large for the 
commercial owners to also manage so oversight of the entity is delegated to a group known 
as the board of directors. This group is usually made up of shareholders, the CEO, and 
independent or non-executive directors.  
 
In the high performance sport domain, who owns the sport organization (in a governance 
sense) is not clear cut. While we certainly have commercial or ‘corporate sport’, the industry 
globally is also heavily dominated by sporting entities that have a ‘not-for-profit’ legal 
constitution. Commonly referred to as NPOs (non-profit organizations), the profits generated 
by these organizations are returned, not to the shareholders, but back to the organization for 
its ongoing viability and development. Our global sport system is replete with NPO sport 
entities with responsibility for governing high performance sport. Examples of such 
organizations include the IOC and international governing bodies of sporting codes such as 
football, tennis, netball, triathlon, rugby union (i.e. FIFA, ITF, IFNA, ITU, IRB etc.).  
Accordingly, the national governing bodies of the sport codes, and the corresponding 
provincial, regional or state bodies and finally, local clubs, are almost always NPOs.   
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Who has the right to govern?: Board composition and member “ownership” of sport 
organisations (Sub Heading – Level C) 
 
So, who has the right to govern a non-profit sport organization? You might assume that the 
key stakeholders have places on the board just as the majority shareholders do for a 
commercial sport entity. In fact, there are multiple stakeholders, including sponsors, funders, 
fans, athletes and the media. Determining who has a place on the governing board can 
sometimes be a vexed question (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). Traditionally, those who are the 
legal ‘members’ have been considered equal to shareholders in a commercial sense with the 
right to govern or have governing representatives. Usually, the members of an international 
body, such as the International Rugby Board are organizations representing the member 
nations (e.g. the New Zealand Rugby Union, the Irish Rugby Union). Similarly, with a 
national sport organization, the state/provincial/regional entities are usually the legal 
members. In turn, the local clubs are usually the members of the regional entity, and 
individuals are members of the local clubs. 
 
It is becoming increasingly obvious within high performance sport, however, that the system 
of governance whereby the member associations, who have traditionally had their 
representative on the board, is creating tensions in the prioritising of resources (Ferkins & 
Shilbury, 2010). Consider, for example, the priorities of a local tennis club and regional 
tennis association, and how their priorities may differ from those of the national body such as 
the French Tennis Federation, or Tennis Australia. The local clubs and associations primarily 
exist for the purposes of participation in tennis. On the other hand, Tennis Australia is one of 
Australia’s largest national sport organizations and has responsibility for elite player 
development and, of course, the Australian Open Grand Slam event. Traditionally, the Tennis 
Australia board has been made up of elected members drawn from its state bodies who, 
historically, have held the view that the state bodies ‘own’ Tennis Australia. However, Tennis 
Australia has recently sought to move to an independent board to allow it to focus in a more 
professional and corporate way (Shilbury & Kellett, 2011).  
 
Indeed, an increasing trend in non-profit sport organization governance is the restructuring of 
representative boards (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). Many NSOs in New Zealand and 
Australia, for example, now have what has come to be known as a ‘hybrid board’ 
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composition (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2010). Set out below are three options for board 
composition of non-profit sport organizations: 
 
 A representative board - where board members are elected from specific member 
 organisations/entities to represent those members; 
 
 A hybrid board - where there is a mix of elected board members and appointed board 
 members; and  
 
 An independent board - where board members are appointed, usually by an  
 appointments panel to govern on behalf of the membership at large. 
 
One of the dilemmas of sport governance in that we tend to deal in uncertainties when it 
comes to the notion of ownership. In addition, the tensions between priorities of high 
performance sport and sport participation are reflected in the governing role. This brings us 
back to the question, who has the right to govern high performance sport? As you can see the 
notion of ownership is closely associated with the complexities of understanding who 
governs sport. Carver (2002, p. 66), a well-known governance specialist, urged, 
“Determining ownership isn’t always easy, but it’s an absolute necessity for boards who wish 
to get in touch with the true source of their authority and their own true governing power”. 
Indeed, there are no easy answers to the question of who has the right to govern high 
performance sport. Shilbury (2001) noted that, in sport governance, there is usually no one 
individual or group of individuals who legally own the organisation and, as a consequence, 
the concept of control is often blurred.  
 
The role and function of the board in high performance sport (Sub Heading – Level C) 
 
Having established some of the challenges in determining who has the right to govern, the 
nature of member ‘ownership’, and how boards are constituted, we now turn our attention to 
board function. What might the board of a sport organization with responsibility for elite 
athlete development or high performance competitions, actually do? Not surprisingly, there is 
a range of perspectives in the literature, and thus far, empirical research efforts to describe 
and analyse the role and function of the board in sport organisations have been limited (Hoye 
& Doherty, 2011). However, in considering the literature on board roles per se (i.e. including 
and looking beyond sport), Kilmister (2006) established a comprehensive list of key elements 
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applicable to sport organizations with responsibility for high performance. These 
roles/functions included: 
 
• overseeing the organization’s systems, processes and actions to ensure that there is 
compliance with externally imposed requirements and that the organization’s internal 
policies and rules are honoured (e.g. compliance with government legislation such as a ban 
on tobacco sponsorship; or internal athlete selection policies);  
• managing the relationship with the chief executive – this includes hiring, firing and setting 
performance criteria for the Chief Executive Officer (e.g. the paid CEO of a national sport 
organization, such as, England Squash and Racquetball is accountable to the volunteer 
board); 
• setting the organization’s mission, vision and strategic direction, that is, the upper level 
components of the organization’s strategy (e.g. the Tennis Australia board provides 
direction in regard to the prioritization of resources for high performance sport versus 
sport participation); 
• setting and monitoring policies, including risk management policies (e.g. the board of the 
Australian Olympic Committee approves selection standards and policies for the 
Australian Olympic and Commonwealth Games teams); 
• monitoring progress towards long-term strategic objectives and monitoring short-term 
results (e.g. the board of the International Federation of Netball Associations monitors 
progress against established strategic priorities such as the globalization of netball); 
• expressing accountability to members and other key stakeholders (e.g. the board of the 
New Zealand Rugby Union reports at its Annual General Meeting to its member regions 
and other stakeholders, such as media, government, sponsors etc.); 
• accepting ultimate responsibility for all organizational actions (e.g. members of the board 
of the Melbourne Storm Rugby League Club accepted ultimate responsibility after major 
breaches in the salary cap were revealed despite the board being found to have had no 
prior knowledge of the breaches). 
 
For those countries where the government plays a major role in fostering and funding the 
sport system (e.g. the UK, France, Canada, New Zealand and Australia), the central 
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governance agencies responsible for sport have established guidelines to assist national sport 
organizations develop their governance capability. These guidelines give us some insight into 
the desired role of the board from the perspective of these funding agencies. UK Sport, for 
example, details the board’s role as, “(1) to set the organization’s strategic aims; (2) to 
provide the leadership to put those aims into effect; (3) to supervise the management of the 
entity; and (4) to report to members on their stewardship” (UK Sport, 2004, p. 6). The 
Australian Sports Commission (2007, p. 6) describes the board’s role as “determining the 
organization’s strategic direction, core values and ethical framework, as well as key 
objectives and performance measures”. It also notes that the board has “ultimate authority 
and responsibility for financial operations and budgeting to ensure the achievement of 
strategic objectives” (p. 6). Finally, Sport and Recreation New Zealand offer a similar 
definition, in describing the role of a governing board as the process by which the board sets 
strategic direction and priorities; establishes policies and performance expectations; 
characterizes and manages risk; and evaluates and monitors organization achievements “in 
order to exercise its accountability to the organization and its owners” (Sport and Recreation 
New Zealand, 2006, p. 16).  
 
While the governance of high performance sport requires that the board cast a long-term view 
of the organization’s future (i.e. often in four-year Olympic or world championship cycles), 
some governance scholars have argued that we need a greater focus on the strategic role of 
the board (Ferkins et al., 2009) and that we need to better understand what this aspect of the 
board’s role actually entails (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Carver (2002), a well-known 
governance specialist, also emphasizes the strategic role of the board. Carver argues that the 
board’s job is to create the future, and not to mind the shop. This statement accentuates the 
forward looking role and the need for the board to contribute at the strategic level, and 
cautions against being captured by the day-to-day demands of the organization.  
 
Garratt (2005) also emphasizes the board’s strategic role and claims that many boards find it 
difficult to balance their monitoring and accountability role with the need to consider the 
organization’s future. In an earlier insightful text, he describes the role of the board in the 
following way (1996, p. 3–4): 
 As I see it, the key to organizational health is a committed and thoughtful board of 
directors, not managers, at the heart of the enterprise. It is the board’s job to keep striking 
balances between the external and internal pressures on the organization to ensure 
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survival. The board must give a clear direction to the business and create an emotional 
climate in which people can align and attune to that direction ... Directing is essentially an 
intellectual activity. It is about showing the way ahead, giving leadership. 
 
This is a big challenge for boards that have responsibility for high performance sport and 
overseeing all of the demands that this entails, not the least of which is often balancing the 
priorities for sport participation and elite development and competition. The case study on 
British Cycling exemplifies the board’s strategic role in balancing these two priorities. Table 
1, which sets out governance theories, also highlights the potential challenges in balancing 
different board roles. We now turn our attention to the relationships between organizations 
that are involved in the governance of high performance sport.    
 
Systemic governance: governing across organizational boundaries (Sub Heading – Level 
B) 
 
A peculiar feature of the sport sector in most countries is that it has evolved from the 
‘bottom- up’. Predominantly, in the late nineteenth century, private citizens founded local 
voluntary clubs to practise their sport. These local clubs established national governing 
bodies to codify the rules, organize competitions, sanction their sporting practice, and 
preserve its social exclusiveness (Houlihan, 1997). This development was rapid. Within less 
than a generation after the first clubs had sprung up in most sports, major regional and 
national competitions were held. Soon afterwards, the governance of many of these sports 
was internationally standardised by the foundation of international sport federations. The 
Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA), for example, was founded in 1904 
by six national football associations, while football had been unknown to those countries a 
mere thirty years before (Van Bottenburg, 2001). 
 
In countries all over the world, sporting practices were initiated, regulated, organized and 
standardized by individual citizens with shared interests. Collectively, they created a global 
sporting system characterized by a hierarchy of vertically-integrated associations and 
federations, in which separate national governing bodies (e.g. the Brazilian Volleyball 
Federation) and international governing bodies (e.g. the International Volleyball Federation, 
FIVB) obtained  jurisdiction over each sport. These organizations were mainly based on a 
system of indirect democratic decision-making by their members (as noted earlier). Club 
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members elected the members of their local boards and representatives of these boards had 
the right to appoint the board members of their national sport federations. The national 
representatives of these federations were, in turn, eligible to vote for board candidates of the 
international federation to which they were affiliated. 
 
In this predominantly ‘bottom-up’ global sport system, the organization of the ‘top-down’ 
Olympic movement is an exception. The IOC was founded before National Olympic 
Committees (NOCs) were established all over the world, at the instigation of the IOC. 
Moreover, board members of the IOC and the NOCs are not democratically-elected 
representatives of lower bodies, instead, they are appointed by what is referred to as a system 
of cooptation. This system of appointment (rather than election) has been criticized because 
of a lack of democracy and transparency, but has also been defended on the grounds that it 
guarantees the independence of the IOC. It is argued that under this system, groups of nations 
cannot collude to elect the IOC members they want for political reasons. 
 
Nation states hardly played a role in the formation of this global sporting system. Until deep 
in the twentieth century, sport in general – and elite sport in particular – were considered to 
be the responsibility of sport organizations, whereby, governments rarely interfered. In most 
countries, the development of both club sport and elite sport was left in the hands of 
voluntary bodies. Wherever there was some government support for elite sport, it was ad hoc 
and limited, such as assistance with travel costs to support the participation of national teams 
in the Olympic Games or other international sport events (Houlihan, 1997; Stewart, 2011). 
 
This situation changed in the second half of the twentieth century and central government 
intervention in elite sport became commonplace. Among the reasons for this transformation, 
the Cold War was the most prominent. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union and 
other communist European countries embraced elite sport as a medium through which they 
could prove their excellence and raise their international status. They created a high 
performance model that was directed towards the systematic identification and nurturing of 
talented athletes. This model contrasted sharply with the rest of the world. Against the state-
led ‘system-related’ model of the East, the West still relied on a ‘person-related’ model, 
where talented athletes had to emerge spontaneously from sport competitions ordered on the 
basis of age, gender, region and standard of play (Fisher & Borms, 1990; Green & Houlihan, 
2005). The success of the Eastern European model, and particularly the success of Soviet and 
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East German athletes at Olympic Games, prompted increased concern in other countries 
about the need for a more strategic, planned and co-ordinated approach to high performance 
sport (Bergsgard et al., 2007). 
 
In this competition for international prestige, government interference was no longer taboo. 
In many countries, high performance sport became institutionalized. Governments and the 
governing bodies of sport developed policies and established new organizations. As a result 
of these changes, 
specialist elite sport policy units have been established; elite centres have been 
created; scientific methods have increasingly been adopted; programmes for the 
professional education of coaches have been developed; and policies for 
identification, selection and training of talented athletes have been designed 
(Bergsgard et al., 2007, p. 154). 
 
Contrasting systems of high performance governance (Sub Heading – Level C) 
 
The introduction of a systematic approach and abandonment of the principle of non-
interference by the state, altered the relationships between sport organizations within nations 
(e.g. NOCs, National Sport Governing Bodies, local sporting clubs) and between sport 
organizations and national, provincial and local governments (Houlihan, 1997). These 
changes raised several new questions about governance in high performance sport. First, who 
was legitimized to set national goals, objectives, and priorities for the high performance 
system? Second, who was responsible and accountable for achieving these goals, and how 
was that related to other sport policy goals such as club development and sport participation? 
Third, how and to what extent should the high performance system be altered from an 
amateur, voluntary and decentralized activity to a professional and centralized undertaking? 
Finally, how and to what extent should the sport system prioritize and thus focus funding on 
sports that have delivered success or shown medal potential, and what might such a policy 
mean for less-developed sports and other sport policy goals, such as raising sport 
participation? 
 
Such questions have important implications for the notion of governance. Consider the earlier 
definitions of governance as expressed by Lynn et al. (2000), Rosenau (1995), and Rhodes 
(1996). In other words, how did countries set about steering, allocating resources, and 
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exercising control and co-ordination (as per Rosenau’s, 1995 definition of governance)? In 
response to these questions, every country developed its own system characterized by a 
specific configuration of governmental institutions, voluntary sport organizations and 
business partners. Schematically, these configurations can be represented within a triangle, in 
which a laissez faire model, a state interventionist model and a voluntary sector model form 
the hypothetical extremes (refer to Figure 1). 
 
Laissez faire system of 
high performance 
sport governance
Voluntary sector system 
of high performance 
sport governance
State interventionist 
system of high performance 
sport governance
 
Figure 1: Contrasting systems of high performance governance within countries 
 
In this triangle, the United States differs most from other countries. Consistent with the 
ideological foundations of American government, the federal government is hardly involved 
in elite sport. In contrast to the increasing governmental interference in elite sport throughout 
the world, there is hardly any policy co-ordination and thus no ‘system’ for high performance 
development in the United States. Athletes have multiple pathways to and through elite sport, 
but there is no well-mapped road to elite status. Each sport must develop its own system. 
National performances continue to rely overwhelmingly on school, university and 
professional systems. For specific sports, these systems indeed offer a structured pathway 
from talent to elite athlete. However, sports that lack professional or university opportunities 
are at a distinct disadvantage and produce few medals (Sparvero et al., 2008). 
 
At another corner of the triangle (refer Figure 1), we find countries with interventionist high 
performance systems. Poland, China, and other former or current communist countries are 
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good examples of this. Jolanta Żyśko (2008, p. 190–91) characterized Poland, for example, as 
‘interventionist, centralized, bureaucratic, intensely formalized but unstable” and “moving 
towards greater centralization and a strengthening of the state administration’s grip of the 
management of sport”. Today, state sport policy in Poland is formalized and regulated by an 
Act of parliament. This Act stresses the role of the state and state administration in sport in 
general, and high performance sport in particular. At the national level, Poland has a 
governmental body dedicated exclusively to sport, which is meant to be the only decision 
centre for the entire field of high performance sport (Żyśko, 2008). For China, elite sport has 
been an effective way to boost its image on the international stage. Since the country started 
its ‘open-door’ policy in the late 1970s, success in the Olympic Games became the highest 
aim of Chinese sport. To achieve this goal the government directed increasing amounts of 
money (from general revenue and from lotteries) to elite sport, and expanded its centralized 
administrative and management system. Priorities for financial support within this system 
included talent selection and development, full-time professional athletes, a strenuous 
training system, coaching and sport science research, and national and regional training 
facilities (Hong, 2008; 2011). 
 
Less obvious is the crucial role of the state in high performance sport in liberal welfare states, 
such as, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Green and Houlihan 
(2005, p. 63) describe Australia and Canada “as the ‘early Western adopters’, and the UK as 
a ‘late adopter’ of many of the principles of organization and administration developed by 
former Eastern bloc countries”. Evidently, the high performance system of the Eastern Bloc 
proved to be successful, leading to a period of dominance at the Olympic Games which began 
in the 1950s and lasted into the 1980s. This was accompanied by a strong decline in the 
‘market share’ of Western countries in Olympic medals. The Eastern Bloc system, however, 
was not easy to emulate, as its interventionist, centralized and bureaucratic governance 
structure was diametrically opposed to the fragmented, decentralized and voluntary 
organization-based governance structure that prevailed in Western countries. The solution to 
this problem was found in the growth of commercial patronage on the one hand and the 
creation of a variety of new administrative infrastructures for high performance sport on the 
other (Houlihan, 1997).  
 
These changes altered the relationships between federal governments and national sport 
organizations. The creation of Sport Canada in the 1970s, the Australian Institute of Sport in 
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1981, the Australian Sports Commission in 1984, the Hillary Commission in 1987 in New 
Zealand, and UK Sport in 1997 were turning points in these countries. They reflected not 
only a much more interventionist stance by their governments but also a decline in the 
autonomy of the national sport organizations regarding high performance sport. The 
provision of funds by the government means the national sport organizations have become 
increasingly dependent on the government contributions to a centralized, professionalized 
and successful high performance system (Houlihan, 1997; Green & Houlihan, 2005). 
 
In most social-democratic countries in Western Europe, central governments intervene less in 
the voluntary sector. High performance sport remains, in principle, the responsibility of 
relatively autonomous sport organizations in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Norway. In these countries, central governments have also expressed increased ambitions to 
promote professional and structured elite sport policies and achieve success in the 
international arena. However, compared to the liberal welfare states mentioned earlier (e.g. 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, UK), they have tried to realize these ambitions in a more 
indirect way, that is, through financial support of the organized sport system, and in particular 
through direct subsidies of the umbrella sport organizations that bear responsibility for high 
performance sport. In Germany, Norway and the Netherlands, these umbrella organizations 
have a far-reaching influence on the distribution of the gaming profits (mainly from lotteries) 
allocated to sport in their countries (Augestad & Bergsgard, 2008; Augestad et al., 2006; 
Bergsgard et al., 2007; Petry et al., 2008). 
 
This section has discussed the three contrasting systems of high performance sport 
governance that are seen in different countries around the world (as encapsulated in Figure 
1). In this, the notion of systemic governance is considered in terms of a network of 
organizations, each contributing to the steering, allocation of resources, and exercise of 
control and coordination of high performance sport. In staying with a macro view of 
governance, in other words systemic governance, our attention now turns to future issues in 
the governance of high performance sport.   
 
Future issues and trends in the governance of high performance sport (Main Heading – 
Level A) 
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Houlihan and Green (2008, p. 291) conclude in their comparative study of elite sport 
development that, “increasing global competition is encouraging a growing number of 
nations to adopt a more strategic approach to the development of elite athletes in order to 
differentiate themselves from ‘rival’ countries”. Other studies endorse this view and show 
that national approaches are based increasingly on a homogeneous model of elite sport 
development, although each country still shows domestic variations (Oakley & Green, 2001; 
De Bosscher et al., 2008; Houlihan & Green, 2008). What almost all countries have in 
common is a trend towards growing interference of governments and a perceived need for 
more effective coordination, central control and governance of high performance sport. 
 
This trend has put pressure in many countries on the relationship between the governance of 
high performance sport and the governance of sport-for-all. With respect to high performance 
sport, questions such as, ‘how to steer’, ‘how to increase efficiency’, ‘how to improve 
accountability’, and ‘how to gain and maintain legitimacy’ increasingly result in different 
answers than when considering sport-for-all. Increasing expenditure on elite sport has forced 
many countries not only to prioritize elite sport over sport-for-all but also to target a minority 
of (elite) sports for funding (e.g. see Ibsen et al., 2011, for Denmark, and Stewart, 2011, for 
Australia). This tendency of exclusion and priority setting increasingly conflicts with the 
principles of sport-for-all policies which are directed towards inclusion and diversity. If the 
demand for success is increased, or if governments allocate less to elite sport, this tension 
will further intensify and provoke a fierce discussion in many countries about the 
fundamentals of both high performance and sport-for-all policies. 
 
Undoubtedly, such a discussion will touch upon other core concepts in governance theory: 
legitimacy and accountability. As Collins (2007) concludes with respect to New Zealand, 
elite sport funding is increasingly driven by the expectation of a ‘return of investment’ and 
the achievement of clearly identified goals (i.e., an output-orientated focus). Legitimacy and 
accountability in sport-for-all funding, on the other hand, are based on arguments concerning 
democratic procedures, social justice, fairness and equality (i.e., an input-orientated focus). 
Here again, it can be expected that this difference will reinforce the tension between high 
performance sport and sport-for-all policies. In high performance sport governance structures 
it is tempting to respond to the pressure to succeed by centralizing the decision-making 
processes and shortening the lines of responsibility. The input-oriented focus of sport-for-all 
policies, however, can easily provoke the opposite response – calls for decentralization and 
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extensive stakeholder participation. In high performance sport governance, one of the biggest 
challenges, for governments and sport governing bodies alike, is how to cope with this 
fundamental tension. After all, in the end, they have a dual responsibility. 
 
 
CASE STUDY: THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITISH CYCLING 
Written by Adam Karg, Deakin University 
 
British Cycling, based in Manchester, is the governing body for cycle sport in the UK. At the 
elite level in cycling, the UK is a world leader. The British team won 34 medals in the 2008 
Olympic and Paralympic Games and half of the available gold medals at the World 
Championships in the same year. In the run-up to the London 2012 games, British Cycling 
boasted strong participation growth and considerable strength in its elite programs, 
underpinned by innovative partnerships and a clear and transparent strategic plan within a 
complex multi-national and regional governance framework. 
History and role 
The aim of British Cycling is to inspire participation in cycling as a sport, for recreation and 
for sustainable transport through achieving worldwide success. The organization, formerly 
known as the British Cycling Federation (BCF) was formed in 1959 following a merger of the 
National Cyclists Union, the Road Time Trials Council, and the British League of Racing 
Cyclists. Prior to this, the presence of these multiple organizations had fragmented the sport, 
resulting in conflicts about regulation, selection of national teams, and who should control 
national governance responsibilities for the sport. The move to a more unified approach was 
complete when the British Mountain Bike Federation, Cyclo-Cross Association, BMX 
Association, and Cycle Speedway Councils became commissions within the BCF.  
Governance structure 
A multi-tiered governance structure incorporating international, national and regional bodies 
is evident in the sport. British Cycling is a member of the international federation, the Union 
Cycliste Internationale (UCI) as well as the European Cycling Union. It has associations with 
the British Olympic Association. The organization itself is governed by a board of eight 
directors, led by an executive president. In 2010 the CEO and senior management team led 
a total of 226 employees, which represented a staffing growth of 13.5% for the year (British 
Cycling, 2010). 
Reflecting its wide coverage, and exemplifying the notion of ’systemic governance’ (refer to 
the main body of the chapter), there is a network of multiple regions which are interlinked in 
the British Cycling governance structure. Representative regions include Central, Eastern, 
East Midlands, North East, North, South, South West, South East, West Midlands and 
Yorkshire regions, as well as the Scottish and Welsh Cycling Unions (British Cycling, 
2011a). The British Schools Cycling Association and British Universities and Colleges Sport 
are also affiliates of British Cycling. As such, British Cycling is the governing body for the 
sport in the home nations and also acts as the UCI member for overseas British territories. 
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The Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are recognised as regions under the national 
governing body of British Cycling (British Cycling, 2011b). While this fosters a centralised 
and standardised approach to Olympic team representation, the situation becomes more 
complex when countries compete as individual nations, as is the case at Commonwealth 
Games events. Below the regional level, around 1,500 cycling clubs or teams are affiliated to 
British Cycling to enable their athletes to hold licenses, race in events and become members 
of the national organization. In total, British Cycling has over 33,000 members, of which 
around two-thirds are affiliated with clubs (British Cycling, 2010). 
The board’s strategic role 
 
A critical role of the board of an organization is to set the organization’s mission, vision and 
strategic direction, and, in the case of British Cycling, the overall strategy for the sport in the 
UK. The environment for cycling in the UK, prior to the 2012 London Olympic Games, 
presented a clear opportunity for the governing body to capitalize, in the design of its 
strategy. In a press release, the CEO of British Cycling, highlighted the opportunities for the 
sport and summarized the strategic, whole-of-sport approach the organization has taken to 
deliver across multiple disciplines and multiple regions: “We have a once in a lifetime 
opportunity in the run up to London 2012 to really engage Britain with cycling and turn our 
‘medal success' into a ‘people success' by inspiring mass participation in our sport” (British 
Cycling, 2009b). The development of a clear strategic plan has been identified as a vital 
component of the sport’s short and long-term success. The sport’s co-ordinated governance 
approach is highlighted by the Whole-of-Sport Plan spanning a five-year period from 2009. 
The plan sought to “grow cycling as a sport, recreational activity and as sustainable transport 
by leveraging the worldwide success of its athletes” (British Cycling, 2009a).  
Another important function of the board of British Cycling is the monitoring of progress 
towards long-term strategic objectives as well as monitoring short-term results. In the 
opening years of the plan, British Cycling demonstrated considerable achievement in key 
areas including institutional goals related to high performance and mass participation as well 
as an increased profile through the promotion and the development of partnerships. At the 
elite level, British Cycling has greatly improved its standing in world events with its success 
at the Olympics and at UCI World Championships, most notably in track and mountain 
biking. The provision of the best possible equipment (NASA and the McLaren Group are key 
technology partners) and progressive and structured sport development and high 
performance programs including Olympic talent, development, academy and podium 
programmes for elite performers have aided this success.  
Additionally, a partnership with British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) has seen the creation of a 
professional cycling team formed as part of British Cycling that competes globally as a 
registered Pro Tour team in events such as the Tour de France (British Cycling, 2010; 
2011c). This partnership, which involves collaboration at the participation and development 
levels as well as sponsorship of the elite national team, provides a great profile for the sport, 
and an avenue to promote and develop its athletes at the highest level. This principal 
partnership has been further supported by UK Sport, the high-performance sports agency 
responsible for investing lottery and public funds, and by Sport England which invests funds 
in organizations and projects that will grow and sustain participation in grassroots sport and 
create opportunities for people to excel at their chosen sport (British Cycling, 2011).  
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Key ‘Takeaways’: 
 
British Cycling: 
 
 Unified what were once separate bodies and cycle disciplines to provide co-ordinated 
leadership and governance for the sport. 
 Unified a number of regions, thereby achieving efficiencies as part of a multiple-level 
governance network including international, national and regional bodies. 
 Has a clear and transparent whole-of-sport strategic plan structured around key sport 
and business outcomes which the board uses to ‘steer’ the organization. 
 Has achieved high performance, sport organization performance and promotional 
outcomes for cycling. 
 
Case Study Discussion Questions 
 
1. Select cycling or another sport in your country and investigate the way the sport is 
governed. In what ways is the structure similar to that of British Cycling? In what 
ways is it different? 
2. Identify the role(s) governance plays in British Cycling’s Whole–of-Sport Plan. 
3. Despite the co-ordination of various regions and disciplines within cycling, 
complexities remain in the structure of British Cycling. What potential problems exist 
given this structure? 
 
Conclusion (Main Heading - Level A) 
 
This chapter began with providing some context to the notion of governance and how we 
have come to use the concept of governance in studying the management of high 
performance sport. We then discussed more specific meanings and definitions of governance, 
and sport governance in particular. Table 1 summarised the examination of theories 
considered to be relevant for our understanding of governance. The distinction between 
organizational governance (governance of organizations) and systemic governance 
(governance between organizations) was also highlighted. In our discussion of organizational 
governance, we detailed the role and function of the board for sport organizations, noting the 
challenge for voluntary board members in balancing a strategic focus with the monitoring and 
accountability role. In the discussion of systemic governance, a much broader interpretation 
of governance was offered. In contrasting the systems of governance within countries, 
elements of sport policy, and sport development were integrated in order to understand the 
network of organizations responsible for the governance of high performance sport.  
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The issues and trends highlighted near the end of the chapter concentrate primarily on 
systemic governance, but also come back to the notion of organizational governance in noting 
that those who govern high performance sport have to grapple with the fundamental tension 
between elite sport and sport-for-all in the allocation of limited resources. Finally, the case 
study, which primarily exemplified organizational governance in focusing on British Cycling, 
also demonstrated the networked approach to the governance of cycling within the UK. In 
many respects, we only really notice the work of the board and the governing system when 
things go wrong in sport. A deeper understanding of both organization governance and 
systemic governance of high performance sport brings to light the tensions and complexities 
of this critical aspect of the management of high performance sport.  
 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
 
1. Distinguish between what the authors describe as ‘organizational governance’ and 
‘systemic governance’. Explain how both views of governance relate to high performance 
sport. 
 
2. Who has the right to govern a sport organization? Explain the composition of a governing 
board that has responsibility for high performance sport. In your answer, refer to the 
board composition models of representative, hybrid, and independent.   
 
3. Why might sport governing bodies struggle in the future with maintaining control and 
legitimacy over their respective sporting code? Consider both organizational governance 
and systemic governance in your answer. 
 
KEY TERMS & CONCEPTS 
 
Governance: a process in which an organization, network of organizations, or a society 
steers itself, allocates resources, and exercises control and co-ordination (Rosenau, 1995; 
Rhodes, 1996). 
 
Organizational governance: refers to governance of organizations, also known as corporate 
governance. These terms encompass the governance issues of steering, accountability and 
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responsibility of a specific organisation such as the governance of a local sport club or a 
national sport organization. 
 
Member ‘ownership’: refers to individuals or organizations of a non-profit body that are 
legally recognised as members and, therefore, usually hold the right to direct who governs or 
governs on their behalf. 
 
Board composition: how the board of a governing body is comprised with specific 
acknowledgement of the responsibility to govern on behalf of the members as ‘owners’. 
There are three types of board composition models evident within sport organizations (i.e., 
representative, hybrid, and independent). 
 
Representative board model: where board members are elected from specific member 
organisations/entities to represent those members. 
 
Hybrid board model: where there is a mix of elected board members and appointed board 
members. 
 
Independent board model: where board members are appointed, usually by an 
appointments panel, to govern on behalf of the membership at large. 
 
Role and function of the sport board: process by which the board sets strategic direction 
and priorities; establishes policies and performance expectations; characterises and manages 
risk; and evaluates and monitors an organisation’s achievements on behalf of its ‘owners’ and 
stakeholders (Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 2006). 
 
Systemic governance: refers to governance between organizations and is related to the 
governance of high performance sport in a system, network or configuration of institutions. 
 
Contrasting systems of governance: refers to the notion that every country has developed 
its own system for the governance of high performance sport. 
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Laissez faire sport governance system: refers to a country’s system for the governance of 
high performance sport where there is little government intervention (e.g. the US). 
 
State interventionist sport governance system: refers to a country’s system for the 
governance of high performance sport where there is heavily centralized state intervention 
(e.g. Poland, China). 
 
Voluntary sector sport governance system: refers to a country’s system for the governance 
of high performance sport where there is a combination of state, commercial, and voluntary 
sector involvement (e.g. Australia). 
 
GUIDED READING 
 
Sport Governance (2007) by Russell Hoye and Graham Cuskelly provides a very good 
overview of organizational governance in sport. It summarizes relevant theories and salient 
topics related to the governance of sport organizations such as the roles and responsibilities of 
boards, board behavior and culture, strategic sport governance, the sharing of leadership 
between the board and the CEO, and conformance and evaluation.  
 
The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? (2003) edited 
by Chris Cornforth, covers issues of organizational governance. While it is not sport-specific, 
it is highly relevant for the governance of non-profit and voluntary sport organizations.   
 
Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (2009) by Bob Tricker is another 
helpful text on organizational governance. While it is primarily focused on the governance of 
commercial organizations, the issues, practices and processes discussed relating to the role of 
the board are a useful foundation for understanding the governance of high performance 
sport.    
 
John Carver on Board Leadership: Selected Writings from the Creator of the World’s Most 
Provocative and Systematic Governance Model (2002) by John Carver is a comprehensive 
text capturing Carver’s publications over two decades. While Carver primarily concentrates 
on elements of organizational governance, such as board-CEO relationships, board 
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involvement in strategy, and board composition, there are sections also relevant for the issues 
embedded within systemic governance. 
 
Studying Governance and Public Management: Challenges and Prospects by Laurence Lynn, 
Carolyn Heinrich and Carolyn Hill (2000) is an article published in the Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory which explains the notion of systemic governance, as 
derived from the public sector. The article pursues the question of how the myriad of 
agencies within the public sector can be co-ordinated to achieve public purpose. 
 
‘Governance and Ethics in Sport’ by Ian Henry and Ping Chao Lee (2004) is a very useful 
chapter in the text, The Business of Sport Management by John Beech and Simon Chadwick. 
The chapter explains the notion of network governance as it applies to professional sport.  
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